


UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE

U.S. Bureau of Agricultural Economics

1.941
R3F223

FARM LABOR IN 1942 AND ITS RELATION TO 1943 PRODUCTION



-Summaries based upon the reports on "Wartime Farm Production Adjustments" from State and Regional committees which were submitted in July and August 1942 at the request of the Secretary of Agriculture. In a few instances material from these reports was supplemented with more recent material from BAE and War Board sources. In the main, however, the point of view is that of June and July 1942, - a fact which should be kept in mind when appraising the comments that follow.
-Estimates of production in 1942 and 1943 are taken from the report "Agriculture's Wartime Production Capacity, Part II (Statistical Supplement) August 1942."
-Comment and information likely to throw further light on the farm labor problem in 1943 are invited.

Washington, D. C.

November, 1942

USDA
LIB

CONTENTS

	<u>Page Number</u>		<u>Page Number</u>
INTRODUCTION-----	1	South Atlantic States-----	14 - 20
New England States-----	2 - 3	(continued)	
Maine-----	2	West Virginia-----	16 - 17
New Hampshire-----	2	North Carolina-----	17 - 18
Vermont-----	2	South Carolina-----	18 - 19
Massachusetts-----	2	Georgia-----	19 - 20
Rhode Island-----	3	Florida-----	20
Connecticut-----	3	East South Central-----	20 - 24
Middle Atlantic States-----	3 - 7	Kentucky-----	20 - 22
New York-----	3 - 5	Tennessee-----	22 - 23
New Jersey-----	5 - 6	Alabama-----	23
Pennsylvania-----	6 - 7	Mississippi-----	23 - 24
East North Central States-----	7 - 9	West South Central-----	24 - 29
Ohio-----	7 - 8	Arkansas-----	24 - 25
Indiana-----	8	Louisiana-----	25 - 26
Illinois-----	8	Oklahoma-----	26
Michigan-----	8 - 9	Texas-----	27 - 29
Wisconsin-----	9	Mountain States-----	29 - 35
West North Central States-----	10 - 14	Montana-----	29 - 30
Minnesota-----	10	Idaho-----	30 - 31
Iowa-----	10 - 11	Wyoming-----	31
Missouri-----	11	Colorado-----	31 - 32
North Dakota-----	11 - 12	New Mexico-----	32 - 33
South Dakota-----	12	Arizona-----	33 - 34
Nebraska-----	12 - 13	Utah-----	34 - 35
Kansas-----	13 - 14	Nevada-----	35
South Atlantic States-----	14 - 20	Pacific States-----	36 - 41
Delaware-----	14 - 15	Washington-----	36
Maryland-----	15	Oregon-----	36 - 38
Virginia-----	16	California-----	38 - 41

FARM LABOR IN 1942 AND ITS RELATION TO 1943 PRODUCTION

INTRODUCTION

Favorable weather, in combination with improved crop varieties, progressive mechanization and better farming practices, led to unprecedentedly high yields in 1942. In September, aggregate crop production was estimated to be 14 percent more than that of the year before and 13 percent above the former all-time peak reached in 1937.

This remarkable record has been achieved despite a decrease in the supply of competent and experienced farm laborers. During the last 2 years more than 2 million workers who were over 14 years of age have left agriculture to enter industry and the armed forces. Among these were thousands of hired men, milkers, truck drivers, and other skilled workers of the sort usually employed on farms. Their loss could be made up in numbers, but not in effectiveness, by the employment of more women, children and older men. In spite of this state of affairs, the acreage of crops lost for lack of labor has been negligible. In early November it seems that shortage of workers for moving and processing the 1942 crops after they are harvested may cause greater difficulties than scarcity of labor for harvest.

In 1943, yields as high as those obtained in 1942 cannot be counted on. Assuming normal yields, it may be feasible to increase the national agricultural output above that of 1942 by about 1 or 2 percent. In some measure substitution of new for old crops will be called for, involving inexperience in necessary practices and possible reduction in effectiveness in the use of labor. The land in intertilled crops, small grains, and hay may be increased by some 7 million acres, which may involve taking some production to poorer lands.

Ignoring these complexities it would appear that in 1943 agricultural production will call for at least 200,000 more workers than were available in 1942. Yet if present trends continue, production in 1943 will have to be achieved with a labor force from which, between July 1, 1942 and October 1, 1943, agriculture will lose approximately 1,300,000 workers. In other words, so far as can now be seen, to obtain in 1943 the volume of foods and fibers that now seems feasible, it will be necessary to recruit at least $1\frac{1}{2}$ million new farm workers.

FEB 1 1943

NEW ENGLAND STATES

MAINE

Aside from a possible shortage of labor at the time of the Aroostook potato harvest, the labor factor has not been a serious handicap to farm production in Maine, in 1942. In 1943 the labor situation will be especially important in connection with dairy and potato production, canning crops, and hay. In the case of milk, on the assumption that labor is not an insuperable barrier, a 22-percent increase in production is regarded as feasible. Potato production, which was 5 percent larger in 1942 than in 1941, may be increased by 5,000 acres (3 percent). Egg production, which will probably be held at the 1942 level, will not be seriously affected by the labor situation.

NEW HAMPSHIRE

In New Hampshire agricultural production will not be curtailed during 1942 on account of labor shortage. In 1943, however, the scarcity of labor and of fertilizer is likely to keep production at or below the average for recent years. Recent surveys of nine rural towns indicated that the sources from which farm labor might be drawn were virtually exhausted. This is especially important for the dairy industry, which has been losing its experienced workers to industry in ever-increasing numbers. Unless this process is checked, the 4-percent increase over 1942 in milk production, which has been regarded as feasible, will not be attained.

VERMONT

Vermont farmers have been willing to part with some help and still maintain a high rate of dairy and poultry production. This belief is borne out by the fact that even though the supply of farm labor has become increasingly short since the fall of 1940, the production of dairy and poultry products in Vermont has shown an increase. Farmers and workers in 1942 were taking care of as many cows as in 1941; in 1943 there may be a slight decrease, since farmers have now reached the balance point as between the amount of labor needed and the maintenance of a high rate of production. Any decrease of labor can reasonably be expected to be reflected henceforth in a decrease of production.

MASSACHUSETTS

Shortage of skilled labor on dairy farms has caused difficulties in 1942 and will be a serious limitation to production in 1943. It is anticipated that milk production will be maintained, however, and even increased slightly to get back to the 1941 level, for it is probable that in 1942 there was some labor on some dairy farms that was not being used to full advantage. Similar observations apply to the poultry industry, in which the number of skilled workers has been steadily decreasing. For this reason, chiefly, increase of egg production in 1943 is believed to be limited to 2 percent.

RHODE ISLAND

Production of food in Rhode Island is likely to be maintained at 1942 levels in 1943, despite the growing scarcity of labor. In milk and egg production a slight increase is regarded as feasible. Potatoes, with their high labor requirements, may drop off somewhat in both acreage and production.

CONNECTICUT

In Connecticut there has been a considerable loss of farm workers during 1942, especially of experienced full-time hired men. At the beginning of the war farmers were used to operating with an excess of labor; now they are able to maintain production despite some loss of hired men. This applies to both dairy and poultry enterprises. In both cases a 3 or 4 percent increase in production in 1943 is regarded as feasible. In vegetable and tobacco production the problem of seasonal labor will be acute in 1943, owing to the high wages paid in war industries.

MIDDLE ATLANTIC STATES

NEW YORK

The high cost of farm labor in New York is primarily the result of the shortage caused by movement of large numbers of farm workers, as well as some farm operators, into industry. Losses of essential farm workers through Selective Service have been small compared with losses to industry. Comments follow on the importance of labor in various branches of agricultural production in New York.

Milk: It is likely that the increasing cost of farm labor may have a decided effect upon milk production unless some provision is made to counteract it. The high cost of farm labor is one of the most difficult problems faced by New York farmers. Only the problem of price relationships is greater.

Indications are that 1942 milk production will be 5 percent above that of June 1941 and that 1943 production will be only 4 percent higher. This may be a reflection of the effects of an increasingly critical labor situation and a slightly less favorable milk-feed ratio, despite a great increase in the work of farm wives and children and despite longer hours of farm labor.

Much of the seasonal labor for the weeding and harvesting of fruit and vegetable crops can be done by young or inexperienced workers from nearby villages and schools or from distant cities when transportation and housing can be provided. But on dairy farms the effect of the decrease in the supply of "regular" or "year-round" or "month" help has been serious. No source of such help has yet been found. Limited numbers of high-school boys helped on dairy farms during the summer but with the opening of school these were no

longer available. In the autumn of 1942, unless some means of providing from 5,000 to 10,000 regular dairy farm workers is found, a decline in milk production may occur. Milk accounts for about one-half of the total agricultural income for New York State farmers. This is an important matter.

Labor requirements on dairy farms in the State are distributed rather evenly throughout the year with the peak load coming in June, July, and August, when from 9 to 11 percent of the annual labor requirements occur monthly. Because of this distribution, farms tend to be organized as one-man farms with the operator alone, two-man farms with the operator and one full-time hired man, or three-or-four-man farms with additional full-time men. In addition to the full-time year-round man, family or hired workers are used for a few months during the summer.

Results of a recent survey show that on about 20 percent of the dairy farms, 90 percent of the farm work is done by the operator. These farms have an average of 12 to 14 cows. Most farms having a full-time hired man have between 20 and 35 cows. Unspecialized labor can be used in many ways on dairy farms to supplement the work of the operator and his skilled helpers. But to a considerable extent the capacity of a dairy farm is determined by the number of full-time skilled workers. When a business becomes larger than the operator can handle alone or with part-time help, considerable adjustments in organizations are necessary if another full-time man is added. Moreover, the duties and problems of the farm manager have increased, particularly in the last few months as production materials have become scarce. Therefore it seems unlikely that operators and regular workers on dairy farms can handle much larger businesses even if additional unskilled workers were available. In fact, it will be difficult to maintain present herds if there is an appreciable reduction in the number of full-time skilled workers and farm operators on farms.

So far no decreased production has been observed but farm operators and members of their families and other available farm labor are reaching the limit so far as output is concerned.

Shortage of labor will probably be an influential factor in the central dairy area in 1943. In the Mohawk Valley and around Utica and Syracuse are war industries which require large working forces and which pay high wages.

A similar situation exists in the eastern dairy area because of the high wages available in the capital district, particularly in Schenectady.

Poultry: It does not seem probable that the number of layers on January 1, 1943 will be more than 10 percent higher than in 1941, because of uncertainty of feed prices and inability to compete for labor.

Tomatoes: The acreage of canning tomatoes grown in New York in 1942 was indicated as 23,700, a 28-percent increase over 1941. In 1943 there is likely to be a 5-percent reduction in acreage. To secure high quality, frequent pickings are required. Labor for picking and handling the crop will be an important factor in determining farmers' plans for canning-tomato

production for 1943. Plans for sufficient supplies of labor for farmers and canners should be well along before the opening of the contracting period in 1943.

Shortage of labor is particularly acute in the Western fruit area, owing to the recent increases in industrial activity in Rochester and Buffalo, and a number of smaller industrial cities in the area.

Snap Beans for Canning: The acreage in New York of snap beans for canning was: 1939 - 6,800; 1940 - 7,600; 1941 - 9,100. Expected acreage 1942 - 12,740; feasible acreage 1943 - 13,000.

Of the 1941 acreage the Western Dairy and Cash Crop Area grew 3,650 acres, more than half of which were in Erie County. About 2,400 acres were grown in the Western fruit area of which somewhat more than half were in Wayne County. The prospective situation as to the labor supply for harvesting the crop will affect farmers' decisions as to snap bean acreage in 1943.

NEW JERSEY

In 1942 milk production on New Jersey farms increased by 5 percent over 1941; in 1943 a 2-percent reduction is probable, due to shortage of labor, transportation difficulties, and uncertainty as to the availability of necessary supplies and equipment. Egg production in 1942 was 9 percent above that of 1941; in 1943 no increase will be feasible. The acreage of tomatoes for processing in 1942 was 4 percent higher than in 1941; in 1943 no increase is likely, nor in the acreage of other processing vegetables. The potato acreage, greater in 1942 than in 1941 by 7 percent, may be increased in 1943 by 5 percent.

In New Jersey the competition with industry for labor is keen. Poultry and dairy farms have not felt the effects so directly as vegetable farms, but their loss of skilled workers has created a serious problem. On farms of the latter class, experienced workers in family groups, principally Italian and colored, have previously handled most of the seasonal fruit and vegetable work. The supply of Italian workers has been declining for several years and in 1942 was almost non-existent. Colored family groups which usually migrate from the South under the direction of a labor contractor have appeared in smaller numbers. To make up the difference, there has been a considerable shift toward employment of local school youth and migrant single males, many of whom are not experienced in harvesting fruits and vegetables. The supply of this type of labor has been more than adequate to take care of total requirements. Inconvenience and other difficulties encountered in shifting to a changed labor supply appear to be the foundation of most New Jersey farm-labor problems. In addition there is the inevitable delay and friction due to lack of complete understanding between the local agencies which have to do with farm problems arising out of wartime conditions, as well as between farmer groups and such agencies. Nevertheless, farm production in 1942 does not appear to be in real hazard because of labor shortage.

In the northern metropolitan truck garden area (Passaic and Bergen Counties), growers have met their labor needs through successful employment of high-school youth. The north central potato area has procured a sufficient number of colored workers from the South, largely because these growers maintain their own contacts with southern worker groups. The greatest difficulties have developed in the central fruit and vegetable area (Burlington and Gloucester Counties). This area has been less successful in adapting to wartime conditions through employment of school youth and inexperienced workers, or through recruiting the substitute labor supply. South Jersey (Cumberland and Salem Counties) has been able to make satisfactory arrangements. Colored family workers from the South have been recruited, and the Bridgeton FSA camp has operated smoothly as the center of labor supply. Several padrones or row bosses in Bridgeton furnish a significant supply of local labor to growers in this area. Additional workers were needed for the fields and canning plants because certain industrial plants did not close down for the summer as usual.

Perhaps the greatest obstruction in making the adaptation to a wartime labor supply is the growers' reluctance to provide adequate friendly supervision. Growers are accustomed to turning the job over to a labor contractor, padrone, or row boss. Consequently, they find it somewhat irksome to have to show inexperienced workers how to pick peaches, tomatoes, or other crops.

Other obstructions in adapting to a changed labor supply are housing and transportation.

PENNSYLVANIA

The proximity of agriculture to industry in Pennsylvania has given rise to fears with regard to the availability of labor. In 1942, however, there have been no losses of production due to lack of labor and no reports of actual shortage except from Bucks County and counties adjoining areas of high demand for industrial labor. Year-round labor is increasingly scarce.

The outlook for farm labor in 1943 is not encouraging, chiefly because of the difficulty of farmers in increasing wage rates in order to meet the competition of industry.

In milk production there was an increase in 1942 of 4 percent over the record for 1941; in 1943 a further increase of 5 percent is regarded as feasible. However, labor has become definitely a factor limiting expansion; in increasingly numerous cases it has even caused contraction. Production on general farms is not likely to be influenced as much as that on specialized dairy farms.

In egg production, 1942 showed a 12-percent increase over 1941; only a slight increase, if any, is regarded as feasible for 1943. In 1942 the labor situation has been critical on only a few poultry farms. In the spring of

1943 the pinch will be much more noticeable, on both general and poultry-specialty farms, but especially on general farms, on which other enterprises compete for labor.

In vegetable production the increasing scarcity of labor will have effect in 1943, along with the lack of processing facilities.

EAST NORTH CENTRAL STATES

OHIO

Although the farm labor situation in Ohio in 1942 has been characterized by uneasiness on the part of farmers, thanks to effective cooperation of War Boards, Employment Service, and other agencies, minimum needs have been met, with no serious losses directly attributable to lack of labor. A possible exception to this statement may arise in the case of tomato production, in which cannery labor requirements, rather than field labor needs, were the cause of complaint.

For 1943, farm labor is noted as one of the factors limiting expansion of (1) pork production, because of the difficulty of securing additional corn, in view of the lower labor requirements of soy beans; (2) milk production, especially in northeastern Ohio; (3) sugar beets and (4) soybeans, particularly in the Northeast where there is a shortage of combines as well as of labor. In general, farmers believe that because of shortages of labor and machinery, acreages of various intertilled crops in 1943 cannot be greatly expanded over 1942.

In northeastern Ohio, the most industrialized part of the State, the farm-labor stringency is most acute. Even inexperienced help is difficult to secure, and to hold, particularly on the dairy farms. Fortunately, farm machinery seems to be adequate for maintaining production at relatively high levels. In southeastern Ohio labor shortage is not serious but western Ohio has its labor difficulties, particularly around some of the larger urban centers, like Dayton.

In Ohio, in 1942, the acreage of soybeans for beans, owing to the relatively low labor requirements, will be expanded to 1,136,000 acres, an increase of 69 percent over 1941. In 1943 this level will probably be maintained.

As regards milk, in spite of labor shortage the 1942 goal of 5½ billion pounds might easily have been exceeded, had not the farm price of milk declined in February 1942. However, 1942 production increased 6 percent over 1941, being just short of the 1942 goal; in 1943 a further 5 percent increase is regarded as feasible.

Sugar-beet acreage for 1942 was indicated at 52,000 acres, an increase of 27 percent over 1941; with a similar increase in production. Acreage for 1943 is expected to be at the same level.

Potato acreage, which in 1942 was 2,000 acres greater than in 1941 (87,000) but 11,000 acres short of January expectations, is expected in 1943 to drop to 84,700 acres. Shortage of labor capable of handling planting, spraying, and other equipment is stated to be the major reason for the drop.

INDIANA

In Indiana the employment of family labor, as reported in August 1942, was about the same as in 1941; the employment of hired help was slightly higher. Apparently farmers have been able to do all of their necessary work without loss caused by shortage of labor. As in Ohio, there has been some difficulty in getting seasonal help for tomato work in canneries. In general it is the processing capacity of tomato packing plants, not availability of labor, that is the determining factor in tomato production in 1942; the same will probably be true in 1943. The volume of milk produced in Indiana in 1943 probably will be somewhat below the level of production expected in 1942 and achieved in 1941, unless pasture conditions improve in unusual degree. In 1942 the acreage of rotation pasture is considerably less than in 1941; no increase is expected in 1943.

ILLINOIS

Shortage of labor has not been a factor limiting agricultural production in Illinois in 1942. In June, however, contacts throughout the State indicated that labor was upon the verge of limiting production. Since then there has been increasing difficulty in maintaining a proper complement of skilled workers on specialized dairy farms in central and northern Illinois. It was anticipated that as farm labor became scarcer there would be increasing competition for labor between corn and soybeans at planting and harvesting and between soybean harvest and seeding of wheat.

Plans were drawn up for assisting farmers in central Illinois to obtain laborers from southern Illinois, where many farms are of the self-sufficing type and the acreage is too small to provide full employment for the operator and members of his family. An obstacle is the general lack of housing facilities for married men with families on dairy and other farms in the northern two-thirds of the State.

Milk production for 1943 is expected to be at about the same level as in 1942, which represented a 3 percent increase over 1941.

MICHIGAN

Among Michigan farmers in 1942 fear of labor shortage seems to have been less common, despite booming wartime industries, than in some neighboring States. In early summer the harvesting of the cherry crop caused some

concern, which proved to be groundless. Labor for the thinning of beets was obtained by what seems to have been an unusually vigorous recruiting campaign in Texas and Oklahoma by representatives of the sugar companies. Dairy labor is increasingly scarce, but does not appear to be a limiting factor in 1942 production, which is expected (July indications) to be somewhat greater than that of 1941. A further slight increase is regarded as feasible for 1943.

Sugar-beet acreage in 1942 is expected to be 36 percent higher than in 1941; a further 10-percent increase is regarded as feasible in 1943, so far as price and labor conditions could be foreseen during the current summer. Actual production, in 1942, however, is expected to be only 3 percent greater than in 1941, with a further 18-percent increase in 1943. In these production prospects the inefficiency, both of new laborers from unaccustomed sources and of operators growing beets for the first time, or in acreages larger than formerly, is a factor.

Potato acreage appears to have fallen off slightly in 1942, in part because of the high labor requirements. A further slight reduction is expected in 1943. The acreage of tomatoes for processing increased by 47 percent in 1942 over the year before, with a similar prospective increase in production. In 1943 the acreage will probably be maintained, but production is likely to fall off from the 1942 level by 13 percent. Tomatoes will be grown by more growers, but the acreage per farm will be limited, in a great many cases, to what the operator himself can handle with the help of his family.

WISCONSIN

Agricultural production has not been affected by labor stringency in Wisconsin in 1942. However, on the larger farms of the State, labor shortage means that less care is given the dairy herds, thus affecting production. Much of the available labor in 1942 was not qualified to handle high-producing herds. Difficulty in maintaining the labor force was most pronounced in the Eastern area. Milk production in 1942 is expected to be about 6 percent more than in 1941; in 1943, production will probably be no greater, if as great but labor is not emphasized in the reports as a crucial factor in this connection.

As regards sugar beets, a dwindling labor supply tends to prevent an expansion of acreage, such as might otherwise be feasible. Production in 1942 was indicated in July as being 23 percent below that of 1941, although 1942 acreage was 30 percent higher. In 1943, acreage will probably be no greater, although it is hoped to raise production to the 1941 level (205,000 tons).

WEST NORTH CENTRAL STATES

MINNESOTA

Farm production during 1942 has not been materially affected by shortage of labor, although toward the end of the year concern over loss of skilled dairy help was frequently expressed. During the harvest considerable use was made of persons registered under the Minnesota Plan for supplying seasonal labor.

During 1943 the increasing stringency of farm labor may limit production in various directions, but not so drastically as in some States. Hog production may be increased slightly; in 1942 there was a 16-percent increase over 1941. Milk production will probably not be increased. The year 1942 saw a 20-percent increase in egg production. In 1943 a further increase of 4 percent is regarded as feasible. Corn acreage will be maintained at the 1942 level; production is expected to be 8 percent higher. Flax production will fall below that of 1942 by 10 percent, although acreage will be maintained.

A limited supply of surplus labor should be available in the Northern Outover area, which is characterized by many small, self-sufficing, and part-time farms. However, this surplus labor is likely to be attracted to nearby mine and woods work rather than to farm work at a distance.

IOWA

War industries are decreasing the number of farm workers in Iowa, especially in the Southeast. But the State as a whole is in a position to meet the withdrawal of manpower for war industry and the armed forces without limiting its farming operations. By late summer of 1942 the total farm labor supply in Iowa will be 7 or 8 percent smaller than it was in 1941.

By spring of 1943 Iowa farmers, their families, and their hired help will have to work about 16 percent more hours to make up for the reduced number of workers. (Iowa Farm Economist, May 1942) Year-round farm labor in Iowa is likely to be cut one-fourth in 1943, all areas of the State being similarly affected. The volume of labor hired by the month for part of the year is likely to be reduced by 40 percent in 1943 and it will be increasingly difficult to keep such men from moving into jobs in war industry. Day labor is likely to decrease by about 30 percent. However, over one-third of the man hours of day labor are used during corn picking, an operation which can be spread out over a longer period and be handled by the farmer and his family.

The labor situation is a factor in milk production in Iowa. No increase is expected in 1942 as compared with 1941, - rather, a slight reduction. In 1943 a further slight decline, perhaps of 3 percent, is expected. Substantial price rises or subsidies would be necessary to bring about increased milk production, in view of the labor shortage and the relatively higher returns that can be obtained from feeding grain to hogs as compared with dairy cows.

at various In the southern pasture area considerable family labor is available for expansion of livestock production, more, probably than in any other part of the State. Unfortunately, the available feed supply in this area is capable of less potential expansion than that of any area in the State, owing to the smaller acreage and yield of corn. Small farms predominate in these counties; they tend to govern their livestock enterprises by the size of their feed crops. Utilization of the family labor on these farms will be dependent upon considerable import of feed grains for hog and poultry enterprises.

MISSOURI

During 1942 the supply of labor that is hired by the month has been adequate, although experienced dairy labor has recently been hard to obtain. Shortage of day labor has caused some partial crop losses, as in strawberries in the southwestern part of the State, and in hay. One of the largest grain crops in recent years has, according to the U.S.D.A. War Board, been harvested without loss due to labor shortage. Apple growers and tomato canners, on the other hand, have had difficulties.

The decline in the number of full-time workers has been felt most severely by the larger farmers. Most farms in Missouri are comparatively small.

In 1943 it is anticipated that shortage of labor will not seriously hamper any major line of agricultural production. This applies to livestock production, including beef, dairy, pork, mutton and poultry. Of these, most uncertainty is expressed as to dairy labor. Among the cash crops, which are of minor importance except in certain limited parts of the State, cotton in Southeast Missouri, Irish potatoes, tomatoes for canning and fruit and vegetables for direct consumption are the crops concerning which most uncertainty as to labor supply is expressed.

In 1943 the following changes over 1942 (indicated July) are regarded as feasible: hog production, increase of 6 percent; cattle and calves, increase of 6 percent; sheep and lamb production, increase of 8 percent; number of milk cows, 3-percent increase (but milk production will probably be 4 percent below the 1942 level); egg production, 5-percent increase, tomatoes for processing, a 9-percent decrease in production over that of 1942, which was 191 percent higher than that of 1941; potatoes, 8-percent increase in production; cotton, a 2-percent decrease.

NORTH DAKOTA

During 1942 no losses in crop production due to shortage of farm labor have been reported, despite a great deal of pessimism regarding the prospects. During the grain harvest the number of family laborers was about average for that time of year; the number of hired helpers on farms was larger than usual although some were inexperienced. Fewer migrants came into the State than in recent years; in part at least this seems to have been due to a very disorganized wage situation. Labor qualified to handle livestock and machinery is increasingly scarce.

For 1943 an 8-percent increase in the number of cattle and calves is regarded as feasible - despite growing concern on the part of range livestock men; also an increase in milk production of 12 percent. Corn acreage may increase by 32 percent. Although wheat acreage is expected to be held at the 1942 level, production will fall to 62 percent of 1942 if average yields prevail.

SOUTH DAKOTA

In the western part of the State there has been increasing difficulty in getting labor capable of handling livestock and farm machinery. Some difficulty was experienced in getting workers for sugar-beet operations, and a large part of the available wild hay could not be harvested for lack of labor. In the eastern part of the State scarcity of labor was somewhat less evident.

In 1943 the question of labor will be especially important in connection with sugar beets, milk, and livestock. The estimated corn acreage for 1943 (2-percent increase over 1942) is planned in anticipation of a labor shortage so as to spread spring seeding work over a longer period and to produce more crop feed that can be "stocked off," should the labor shortage become critical. The number of milk cows may be less than that estimated (2-percent increase over 1942) if adequate help is not available; likewise the potato acreage may be somewhat less than is estimated (11-percent increase over 1942). In general farmers will try to maintain the estimated production of corn and small grains and livestock production in spite of a serious labor shortage. A 3-percent increase in milk production over 1942 is regarded as feasible, assuming no drastic worsening of the labor situation. Flax acreage can feasibly be increased by 14 percent but production will be considerably less than in 1942 if average yields prevail. An increase of sugar-beet acreage from 10,000 acres (indicated, July 1942) to 11,000 is regarded as feasible, if efforts to secure harvest labor in 1942 do not prove too disillusioning. Availability of labor is thus the chief problem for 1943 in South Dakota.

NEBRASKA

The regular labor supply in the State is expected to fall steadily during the harvest and seasonal labor even more, affecting the grain-producing areas of southern and western Nebraska particularly. However, family labor will make increased egg production possible. In general, the crop production feasible for 1943 will change little from 1942, but livestock and livestock products can be increased, particularly hogs, wool, and chickens, unless labor supply falls more than is now anticipated. In considering the effects of the war demands upon labor, it is feared that many areas will lose 15 to 30 percent of their farm operators. Every resource of labor, equipment, and labor-saving types of farming will have to be used.

In 1943 an increase in hog production of 46 percent over 1942 is regarded as feasible although in 1942 the increase over 1941 amounted to 64 percent. The number of cattle is likely to increase by 5 percent in 1943, the number of sheep by 4 percent, and milk and egg production by 3 percent each. No increase in sugar-beet acreage over that of 1942 is regarded as feasible but the 1942 acreage was a 33-percent increase over 1941. In potato production there will probably be a slight decrease.

The northern section of the East Loess Hills area, producing feed grains, hogs, and beef cattle more intensively than any other in the State, will find decreasing labor supply one of its principal handicaps. Planning for better seasonal labor distribution can help. The southern section, which produces more cash grain, will have a similar situation.

The withdrawals from family-labor forces through the draft will be a handicap to 1943 production in the Loess-Drift Hills but increased corn acreage is expected. The wheat crop is favored because it demands less labor, and farmers have more adequate equipment for handling it.

The Nebraska Plains area expects to have sufficient labor to maintain sugar-beet production equal to that of 1942. Increased hog and cattle production is anticipated despite decreasing labor supply.

The West Loess Hills and Canyons area is planning somewhat increased corn, oat, and hay acreage, and hog and poultry production in face of the decreasing labor supply. Labor shortage will be felt most in sugar beets, potatoes, and grains.

The Western Tablelands area expects increased livestock production. If sugar-beet labor is scarce, corn will displace some beet acreage.

In the Sandhills-Cattle Ranching and General Farming and the Northern Tablelands areas raising of beef cattle for feeders predominates. Production of other livestock and of crops is minor. Cattle numbers in 1942 are about at a maximum; the problem will be to hold them despite decreasing hired labor supplies.

KANSAS

In Kansas, the 1942 farm-labor situation has been characterized by a gradual lessening of the regular labor supply and by a process of replacement from sources not ordinarily resorted to. In 1943 more regular labor will be lost, dairymen being affected more than any other class of farmers.

Milk production in Kansas, according to July indications, increased somewhat over that of 1941 but not to the level of the goal set in January. The number of cows was greater than expected; in 1943 there may be some further increase in their number. Pasture conditions this year have been exceptionally favorable but it is difficult to maintain production, for many large dairies are being liquidated, the cows going into the hands of small

producers. In 1943 milk production is expected to drop to 3,264,000 pounds, as compared with 3,285,000 indicated in 1942. Some areas will be more seriously affected than others. In the Kansas City district, where numerous nearby war plants and cantonments create a heavy demand for dairy products, the competition for labor and the effect of the draft will be most severe. Here, as elsewhere, commercial farms will be hardest hit; family-type farms will utilize their labor force to better advantage and will bring in most of what increase in milk flow there is. In the Flint Hills area, dairy farmers will be hard hit in 1943, when there may be a shift from silo crops to hay and grain, in order to save labor. The central area of Kansas in 1943 will face a shortage of year-round dairy hands, but will probably be the last area in the State to fall behind in dairy production. Increasing the acreage of feed crops and the number of hogs will bring about a more diversified farming and a better seasonal distribution of farm labor.

In the southeastern area of Kansas there will be a larger increase than elsewhere of the soybean and flax acreage, and an increase in the number of sheep and hogs. This adjustment will improve the distribution of family labor throughout the year. The number of hogs in Kansas is expected to increase by 32 percent over 1942 and that of sheep by 4 percent. The number of cattle and calves is expected to drop by 10 percent.

Truck farmers in the Kansas City marketing area have had labor difficulties in 1942 and will suffer in 1943. So far there has been no shortage of the Mexican labor used in sugar-beet production in the southwest area. Both in 1941 and 1942 the procurement of labor for harvesting broomcorn in Stevens County has presented a problem, considerable labor from outside the area being required. Livestock production in the southwestern area in 1943 may be affected by the scarcity of herders and of fencing.

A survey conducted by the War Board in August 1942, to determine the effect of the labor situation upon 1943 production, indicated that there would be a 6-percent reduction in the acreage intended for crops, as compared with the 1942 crop acreage.

SOUTH ATLANTIC STATES

DELAWARE

In estimating feasible production for 1943, farm labor supply is regarded as one of the most important factors in all lines of production. Even in 1941, according to a State report, the growth of defense industry reduced the volume of available labor by 25 percent.

In 1943 the availability of farm labor will be an important factor in milk production, which in 1942 was at the same level as in 1941. A 7-percent increase is regarded as feasible for 1943. Increasing scarcity of labor limited expansion of corn acreage to 3 percent in 1942 instead of the 10 percent permitted under the AAA program. An increase of 5 percent is regarded as feasible in 1943. In the case of soybeans, on the other hand, expansion of acreage is stimulated by the labor scarcity, since soybeans, being harvested by combine, may save labor. In 1943, soybean acreage is expected to be twice that of 1941 and 46 percent higher than that of 1942.

The acreage of tomatoes for processing in Delaware in 1942 is some 15 percent higher than that of 1941; a further increase of 8 percent is held to be feasible in 1943. Even in 1941, canneries operating in the State had only 60 to 70 percent of a full labor force; in 1942 the situation has not improved but the 1942 tomato acreage is not far below canners' present capacity to process.

Prior to 1942 (April) Negro workers were not recruited for war industries in Delaware. The change in this regard has further depleted the ranks of farm laborers, which in Delaware are largely composed of Negro workers.

MARYLAND

In 1942 possible shortage of farm labor has been a subject of concern in connection with truck crops on the Eastern Shore, in fruit production in the Piedmont area, especially in Washington County, and in the tobacco area of southern Maryland.

In 1943 the seasonal-farm-labor problem on the Eastern Shore may be of considerable magnitude. Normally some 5 or 6 thousand migratory workers follow the harvesting season from the South. In 1942 the size of this stream was materially reduced; in 1943 it may vanish altogether; the cause is mainly the transportation problem. One of the crops that will be particularly affected is canning tomatoes, in the production of which Maryland yields place only to California and Indiana. The larger volume of tomatoes is produced on the Eastern Shore; the counties surrounding Baltimore are also heavy producers. In 1942 production was 312,100 tons (August indications), which was a 12 percent increase over 1941; in 1943 a reduction of 14-percent is regarded as likely, despite a slight increase in acreage over 1942. The two obstacles to increased production of tomatoes for canning in Maryland are scarcity of labor, both on the farm and in the canning plants, and shortage of canning-plant capacity at the peak of the season.

The five southern Maryland counties, which are highly specialized in tobacco production, are likely to feel a shortage of labor, since naval construction projects and war industries in Baltimore and elsewhere are drawing labor from the farms. Farmers are giving consideration to the production of other commodities that will require less labor, and to the adoption of practices that will dispense with certain labor-consuming operations.

Lack of labor is cited as one of the chief obstacles to increased production of corn, especially in the northern Eastern Shore and the Piedmont Plateau, where feed is required for the increase in numbers of dairy cattle, hogs, and other livestock which farmers would like to undertake. In 1942 an increase over 1941 in the corn acreage of about 2 percent is indicated; a further increase in 1943 of 5 percent is regarded as feasible, if the labor situation permits it.

VIRGINIA

In 1942 the farm-labor situation in Virginia was a source of uneasiness, particularly in areas adjacent to the navy yards and near Washington. There was enough labor to get the essential farm work done, but many farm improvements were neglected. Throughout the State the larger farms had trouble finding sufficient help, and many dairy farms were shorthanded, particularly during corn harvest and silo filling. In the area adjacent to the powder plant at Radford, farmers were expected to suffer from a shortage of labor, especially at corn cutting and husking time. In southeastern Virginia the labor situation was extremely difficult, because of the proximity to the shipyards.

The situation in 1943 is likely to be much worse than in 1942. The committee suggested a direct federal subsidy to farm hands in areas adjacent to war plants in order to keep farm wages in line with industrial wages.

Peanuts: More than 90 percent of the peanut crop in Virginia is grown in the seven counties southeast of Petersburg, the so-called peanut and cotton belt. In 1943 it would seem feasible to retain the present allotment of 131,000 acres for edible peanuts and in addition establish a goal for peanuts for oil of not more than 24,000 acres. In this area a goal of 15,800 acres of soybeans would also seem feasible. These three would constitute an acreage of 171,000 or about one-half of the total harvested acreage of crops and a 7 percent increase over the 1942 acreage. To go any further than this in these 7 counties would interfere with regular crop rotation and create labor difficulties due to uneven labor distribution.

Soybeans: All the increases in the soybean crop should take place in that part of the State east of the Blue Ridge Mountains and particularly in middle Virginia, the South Side, and the part of the State that is east of Richmond between the Potomac and the James Rivers. It is here that the least competition exists between crops. Also, all these areas have a reasonably adequate labor supply. Feasible soybean acreage for 1943 is placed at 174,000 acres, a 120-percent increase over 1942.

Milk Production: In 1942 the milk goal was surpassed, milk production being indicated in July as 7 percent more than that of 1941. In 1943 a 3-percent increase over the 1942 goal seems feasible. In northern Virginia one of the chief obstacles to greater production is lack of labor, not only to milk cows but to grow the silage corn necessary to support a further increase. Farmers in middle Virginia appear to have sufficient heifers to retain herd replacements, more than enough roughage, and enough labor.

In the eastern vegetable area and near Richmond, where there is need for much more milk than can be produced locally in 1943, there is an acute shortage of labor.

WEST VIRGINIA

The farm-labor problem in West Virginia in 1942 has not been critical. Some concern was expressed in the orchard areas in the Eastern Panhandle of

the State and on some scattered dairy farms. Indications are that 1942 will see no losses in production caused by labor shortages.

There is every prospect that labor will be available to meet the farm needs of 1943. The problem will be to discover it and make it available where needed.

NORTH CAROLINA

Taking the State as a whole, North Carolina has enough labor available to take care of the expected increases in production in 1943. In some areas, however, there is likely to be difficulty in securing sufficient labor at critical periods, for example in the Southern Tidewater in connection with the peak seasonal requirements of commercial truck and fruits, cotton, tobacco and peanuts for oil, and in the Northern Tidewater, in connection with the May-June requirements of potatoes and vegetables and the August-October requirements of cotton, tobacco and peanuts. The critical labor situation in these areas is heightened by migration to defense jobs.

Soybean production in North Carolina may readily increase in 1943 by as much as 68 percent over 1942, in which year there was a 47 percent increase over the year previous. The prospective labor situation tends to encourage expansion of soybean acreage at the expense of peanuts, since soybeans require less labor. Land normally used in production of corn and hay will be shifted to soybeans rather than to peanuts. It is on large farms rather than on small family-sized farms that the greatest shifts may be expected, for on the latter the available labor must be used to maximize production on such high-income crops as cotton and tobacco.

In 1942 peanut acreage increased by 31 percent over 1941; in 1943 a further 7-percent increase is regarded as feasible. If price relationships permit, some land may be shifted from cotton to peanuts, especially on large mechanized farms in the Coastal Plain, where cropper labor is growing scarce.

Areas in which labor is likely to be an important factor in production in 1943 are as follows:

Northern Tidewater: In this area the medium-sized farms will suffer most from labor shortage. The small farmers rely on family labor. Mechanization will relieve the situation on large farms.

In Currituck, Pasquotank, and neighboring counties it is the opinion of farmers that the acreage of Irish potatoes in 1943 will be reduced by about 3,500 acres because of the possible scarcity of fertilizer and labor. For the State as a whole it is expected that 1942 acreage - 83,000 acres -- will be maintained. In this area important war industries have absorbed all surplus adult male labor. Potatoes have been harvested largely by migrant labor. Competition elsewhere for this class of labor, and transportation difficulties, are expected to create a shortage in 1943. Operation of two FSA labor camps in the area has alleviated the problem in 1942.

Southern Tidewater: Most farmers in this area are dependent on croppers; there is very little regular hired labor. Within recent years there has been a definite trend toward mechanization. Nevertheless there are periods of peak labor shortages especially in the harvesting of commercial truck, fruit, tobacco and cotton.

Central Coastal Plains: During the past few years there has been a tendency in this area to change from croppers to hired hands but at the present time there is a change in the opposite direction in order to secure dependable labor. A great deal of the labor formerly used on the farms is now employed in defense industries. The shortage will be felt especially at the time of peak labor demand for tobacco harvesting and in the fall when cotton, peanuts, corn, and soybeans are being harvested. Shortage of labor is one of the major obstacles there to increasing the acreage of peanuts for oil.

Sandhills Area: The peanuts-for-oil goal for 1942 was 26,500 acres in this area. Less than one-fourth of this goal will be obtained. Problems will arise in picking the peanuts harvested unless a special effort is made to get pickers. There were only a few peanut pickers in the area when this report was written.

The critical labor peak occurs here during the harvest period for cotton and peanuts.

Lower Piedmont Area: Farmers should be able to carry out their 1943 production plans in this area. There will be some shortages of fertilizers and labor but the operators will probably be able to adjust to the situation. The main shortage of labor will occur at cotton-picking time.

Northern Piedmont Area: A shortage of labor will not particularly jeopardize the shifts in agriculture necessary for the attainment of 1942 production goals. However, such shortage will undoubtedly affect tobacco and cotton production in 1943. This will mean that the farmer will have an opportunity to increase dairy and poultry production as an alternative to that of tobacco and cotton.

Central Piedmont Area: The labor in this area is largely family labor. Unless the situation becomes more critical than in mid-1942 the supply will be adequate. The labor peaks will not be acute because the increase of small grain and soybeans in 1943 will be handled mainly with machinery. The increase in dairy production will probably be attained through wider use of family labor.

SOUTH CAROLINA

In 1943 full use of the State's farm labor resources will be necessary. Adjustments for small farms should include better utilization of labor, for large ones, a possible shift from crops requiring much labor to others requiring less - for example, from cotton, tobacco, and corn to small grains. Large farmers will feel the labor shortage most keenly, since they do most of the hiring and have to compete with industrial wage rates.

In 1943 farm production can probably be kept up to the 1942 level. In this State cotton seed, rather than peanuts or soybeans, will be the oil source because farmers have had little experience with the latter crops, and will be reluctant to try them. In 1942 peanut acreage rose to 70,000 acres as compared to 19,000 acres in 1941; in 1943 an increase to 121,000 acres is regarded as feasible. Soybean acreage in 1941 was 12,000 acres; in 1942 there was an increase of 10,000 acres; in 1943 61,000 acres are expected. Next year a 3-percent increase in the cotton acreage (1942: 1,247,000 acres) is regarded as feasible. For the State as a whole, milk production is expected to increase by 8 percent over 1942, egg production by 22 percent.

In the Piedmont area, characterized by small farms and rolling land, mechanization is gradually increasing, and with it, increase of day labor and displacement of tenants. This makes it easier for workers to leave for better paying jobs. Farm labor will apparently be short in 1943, and existing labor and machinery will have to be used effectively to keep up production, especially of eggs, milk, and peanuts.

Farmers in the Upper Coastal Plain, where half of the peanut acreage in the State is found, complain about competitive wage rates. The area is adapted to increased use of farm machinery, but the high proportion of tenants and croppers discourages its use. Along the Lower Coastal Plain, where tobacco is the chief crop much low-paid labor is available.

GEORGIA

Despite misgivings, the farm labor supply during 1942 proved to be adequate. In the Coastal Plains area in September difficulties arose, as this was the period of peak labor requirements for both cotton and peanuts.

In 1943 the shift of labor to the armed forces and to industry, although likely to reduce the seasonal labor supply, will not form a serious barrier to agricultural production. As the following commentary by areas suggests, there is room for a great deal of improvement in the utilization of family and year-round labor. This is particularly important in the case of cotton and peanuts. In 1942 the peanut acreage rose by 84 percent; in 1943 another 15-percent rise is regarded as feasible. Cotton acreage, meanwhile, has been reduced in 1942 only 2 percent below the 1941 acreage, with a further 6-percent reduction expected in 1943.

In the Limestone Valleys little labor is hired. Family labor is typical. Increase of dairy or hog production means more intensive family work.

One-mule equipment predominates in the Upper Piedmont. A little labor is hired. There has been considerable loss to industry, defense projects, and the armed forces. The incomplete use of time on small farms will allow considerable time for work off farms. Large farms are faced with a shrinkage of their labor forces to half the usual numbers. Less corn will be produced, but more cotton, hay, small grains, and poultry. Acreage will be maintained.

Half-row equipment and poorly utilized labor have long characterized Lower Piedmont farming. But the development of large war projects has cut the farm labor supply, forced a resort to more machinery and caused a shift to less labor-demanding crops. The 1943 labor situation may reduce cotton acreage.

The plantation system and its cropper labor are characteristic of the Northwest Coastal Plain area, but of late there have been shifts to machinery and wage labor. In 1943 a cut in cotton acreage is expected while production of peanuts, small grains, and hogs is expected to increase.

Regular laborers and croppers supplemented by seasonal labor from local towns, form the bulk of agricultural labor in the Northwest Coastal Plain. Conflicts of crop operations and a limited labor supply will force a reduction in cotton and corn acreage to allow increased peanut acreage.

The South Coastal Plain, with its diversified family-size farms, uses both croppers and wage hands, also seasonal harvest labor. The labor supply will limit peanut production because of the peak demands at harvest. Increased production of peanuts and hog foods will force reducing of truck crops and non-vital commodities. Cotton acreage will probably be cut.

FLORIDA

In Florida little change is expected during 1943 in dairy production but egg production may increase by 9 percent over 1942 (in which year a similar increase over 1941 was indicated), hog production by 7 percent over 1942, cattle and calves by 9 percent, and peanuts by 38 percent.

Difficult labor problems anticipated for 1942 failed to materialize. As regards 1943 the most uncertain factor is the availability of transient labor upon which much fruit and vegetable production depends. Local farmers and members of War Boards in southern Florida have been working on a plan to import farm labor from the Bahamas.

In the Everglades the competition for labor between sugar and truck-crop production has been increasing. There are prospects of a shortage of labor during the cane-cutting season this winter.

EAST SOUTH CENTRAL STATES

KENTUCKY

The crop and livestock production expansion asked of Kentucky farmers in 1942 did not appreciably intensify existing peaks of labor demand, but lengthened them to some extent. Larger dairy, poultry, and pork production will require increased winter labor which conflicts only slightly with crop needs. The result will be more man days of work per person, but no great increase in numbers of farm laborers. Farmer interest in better farming

practices will be increased by the need for increased production in 1943, and by labor scarcity and higher costs in much of the State.

Commercial farm areas with seasonal labor demands will be bothered by labor shortages in 1943, but not enough to reduce production seriously. This should reduce the tendency to use labor below its economic capacity. The Bluegrass, Pennyroyal, Lower Ohio Valley, and especially the urban areas around Cincinnati and Louisville will be most affected. Elsewhere no shortages of labor are expected.

The Mountain region of eastern Kentucky is an area of large farm families and surplus labor. Its mountainous terrain and the distance from industrial centers act as a barrier to free movement of labor to other areas.

A successful attempt to bring the supply in this area in contact with the need elsewhere was worked out in the late summer, when about 250 workers from the mountains of southeastern Kentucky were transported to Shelby and Henry Counties to help in the tobacco harvest. Shelby County farmers agreed in advance to give the workers board and lodging and pay them \$2.50 a day. In October, workers were to be transported from the mountains to aid in the harvest of seed hemp in Henderson and Union Counties.

In the Eastern Pennyroyal and Knobs areas, surplus labor has largely disappeared. The seasonal labor problem in 1943 may be critical in the north and west of the area. Increased use of labor-saving machinery is to be recommended, but even more, the change of crops to allow larger production of feed per unit.

The Bluegrass Area will probably have a labor shortage in 1943 because industrial plants and military projects are attracting so much labor. The Outer and Intermediate Bluegrass areas will be most affected. In the former, conflicting planting and cultivating operations bring a June peak which requires over a quarter of the total hiring for the year. Women and children can do considerable of this work and should be a source of labor supply for it. The latter area has an August peak in the cutting and housing of tobacco, when three-quarters of the annual farm hiring takes place. But the production of farm products of which the largest war increases are desired will add little to present peaks.

The areas near Cincinnati, Covington, and Louisville may be expected to have severe labor shortages on farms. Farmers will have to recruit youth from rural and city areas, and develop other unusual sources. Any increase of production will have to be accomplished by these types of labor.

The Pennyroyal Plain has its peak labor demand at tobacco and corn cutting time in September and October. It has been an area of surplus labor. The drain of labor away from it will be slow because most of it is Negro labor.

The West Coal Field is a subsistence-tobacco-farming area, with which coal mining, oil and gas fields are joined to furnish part-time employment. These nonagricultural industries promise to become more important as the war progresses. But the family-type farming with its large labor supply will

apparently furnish enough labor for the area. Adjacent areas needing labor might draw upon it.

The Lower Ohio Valley will probably have a farm-labor shortage in 1943. Increased use of machinery and of unusual kinds of labor may prevent the situation from becoming acute. The peak demand comes in June when about one-third of the total labor force is hired to care for corn, tobacco, and hay crops.

TENNESSEE

There has been concern in Tennessee over the drift of farm labor to industry. Although the view is widely held that any further depletion of the farm-labor supply will present a real hazard, farm production in 1942 has not been adversely affected. Milk production increased 8 percent over 1941 and a further increase of 9 percent is regarded as feasible for 1943. The acreage of tobacco in 1942 was 6 percent greater than in 1941. Cotton acreage also rose by 6 percent, but a slight decrease is likely in 1943.

Anticipation of possible labor difficulties may mean that some farmers grow soybeans on cotton land in 1943. The supply of farm labor will be a serious problem in the principal milk-producing area of the State. Much of the work is of a type that cannot be readily performed by pooling labor or calling on non-farm workers for short period seasonal jobs.

In Gibson County, the major truck-growing county in Tennessee, where the Wolf Creek Ordnance Plant is located, farm labor is a serious problem. Local concern over labor conditions is an important factor in the indicated reduction of both corn and cotton acreages for 1943.

In the Northern Highland Rim area, the principal dark-tobacco-producing area of Tennessee, the development of Camp Campbell creates a labor problem. Farm labor in recent years has been relatively abundant because of the decline of tobacco production.

Labor shortage in the commercial farming area of the Central Basin affects milk, eggs, pork, beef, and lambs. This shortage has been intensified by increased industrial activity in Nashville and in the Huntsville, Alabama, area and by the construction of an air base in this district. For 1943 a reduction in the acreages of cotton and corn and further increases in small grains are indicated. These adjustments will be most pronounced on the larger farms.

In the Bradley, McMinn, and Polk area, the labor situation has been acute because of the construction work carried on by the Tennessee Valley Authority and by the Hercules TNT plant at Chattanooga. It is expected that much labor so employed in 1942 will be available for farm work in 1943.

In the Greater East Tennessee Valley, the work on five dams and increase of activity in large commercial plants have absorbed much labor usually

available for farm work. Much of this will presumably be freed for farm employment with the completion of the dams in 1943.

ALABAMA

During 1942 no critical labor shortages developed although in September, when the peanut harvest coincided with cotton picking, efficient use of available labor was required, especially in the area around Dothan (Houston County), in southeast Alabama. In some areas, lack of workers was associated with extremely low wages.

In 1942 the increase in peanut acreage over 1941 was in the neighborhood of 110 percent. A further increase of 20 percent is expected in 1943. A 3-to-7- percent increase in production of hogs, cattle and calves, and milk, is expected in 1943. Egg production which increased 24 percent in 1942, will be maintained in 1943.

The labor stringency in 1943 will be greatest on the large farms which depend on croppers and wage hands, and on farms too large to be operated by one family but not large enough for two families. Day labor will be exceedingly hard to get during the peak periods. Farms in southeast Alabama will be affected most seriously; here 90 percent of the market peanuts of the State are grown.

In the Tennessee and Limestone Valleys, as a result of a considerable drain of labor to war industries located there, the labor shortage is likely to be serious in 1943.

The present farm-labor force of the Black Belt black soil area, largely Negro is losing numbers because of migration. The shift to machinery on the large operating units has counteracted this loss, but the labor turnover is high, and agriculture faces difficulty in obtaining enough efficient labor. Elsewhere in the Black Belt farms of the family type are losing workers to draft and industry, but probably not so much so that 1943 production will suffer.

In the southwestern Coastal Plains war work at Mobile has attracted many workers from farms. Recent low cotton yields facilitated this movement. Large farmers feel the labor shortage most quickly and severely.

MISSISSIPPI

Scarcity of labor has not affected agricultural production in Mississippi in 1942, although at the time of writing the cotton harvest had yet to be completed. According to the U. S. Employment Service, some 40,000 cotton pickers from outside the Delta are needed in that area during September and October 1942. These should be available within the State, provided wage, transportation, and housing conditions are suitable. In some counties, Neshoba, for instance, there have been complaints as to shortage of dairy labor. However,

milk production in Mississippi in 1942 is expected (July indications) to be 9 percent greater than that of 1941; in 1943 a further increase of 16 percent is regarded as feasible. The greatest indicated increase is in the Hill areas, where dairying is relatively unimportant as a commercial enterprise. Generally speaking, Mississippi farms are not utilizing their full productive capacity in 1942; increases in 1943 appear to be feasible, even in view of an increasingly stringent farm labor situation and increasing scarcity of many of the materials of production.

In 1943, as in 1942, apparently all areas will have a sufficient supply of manpower to plant and harvest the expected acreages, with the exception of the Delta and, possibly, the Long Leaf Pine area in south-central Mississippi. The Gulf Coast, the Lower Coastal Plains and the Northeast Prairie areas may have difficulties in competing for seasonal labor with war industries but these should not be so severe as to limit production in 1943. The Copiah County truck area has a more than ample farm-labor supply for total estimated feasible production in 1943.

The chief difficulty will arise in the Mississippi Delta, during the cotton picking season of 1943. In the past the Delta has depended upon off-farm sources for approximately 50 percent of its harvest laborers. Most of these have been drawn from adjacent Hill areas. To what extent this will be possible in 1943 is not clear. Undoubtedly, extraordinary measures will have to be taken to make sure of the estimated 71,000 laborers that will be required from outside the Delta in October 1943. Cotton acreage in Mississippi in 1943 is expected to be about the same as in 1942 (2,532,000), which was a 3-percent increase over 1941.

In the Longleaf Pine area the farms are of the cotton, general farming, truck, self-sufficing, and part-time types. Most of them are small. Nevertheless, in May 1942, reports of farm-labor shortages were more numerous from this area than from any other agricultural area in the State. The difficulty seems to be due, not to a lack of manpower in the area, but to reluctance to work under conditions now prevailing.

WEST SOUTH CENTRAL STATES

ARKANSAS

The long-awaited harvest-labor shortage in Arkansas apparently will not materialize in 1942. Fear of a serious labor shortage for the cotton and rice harvest is rapidly giving way to a feeling of certainty that the 1942 crops will be harvested without serious loss. Farm labor from the usual sources is relatively scarce, but family labor is being more fully utilized and the inducement of only slightly higher wages is substantially increasing the farm-labor force. Cotton harvest probably will be extended over a somewhat longer period than usual. Farmers are transporting laborers relatively long distances, as housing facilities for seasonal workers are not available on the plantations. As usual, large numbers of workers will have to be brought into the Delta and rice areas for cotton and rice harvest, but the U. S. Employment Service anticipates no difficulty in supplying the necessary workers. Memphis will sup-

ply as many Negro pickers for the Upper Delta as ever, despite unusual urban employment opportunities - another example of the favorable response of unskilled labor to attractive wages. Reports are frequently received that farms are going out of production because of labor shortage. The farms in question are nearly always found to be subsistence units in poor land areas.

In 1943 in Arkansas an increase in hog production over 1942 of 14 percent is regarded as feasible, in milk production an increase of 18 percent, and in egg production one of 26 percent. In the production of peanuts there was a rise from 19,000 acres in 1941 to 72,000 acres in 1942; in 1943 an acreage of 154,000 is thought practicable. Soybean production may be doubled. As regards cotton, a slight decrease in acreage, but not in production, is anticipated. To achieve these objectives labor and other resources must be more effectively used than in 1942. Probably in the Delta, Rice, Ozark Mountain, and Ozark Plateau areas the labor situation will cause most concern.

In the Arkansas Valley there is some conflict between the labor needs of cotton and peanuts. Cotton is usually picked in September and October; but the season can be extended to December. Peanuts are harvested in September and threshed in November. In the Coastal Plain harvests of corn, cotton, and peanuts all come close together, making difficult labor peaks.

The loss of labor to the draft and to nonfarm work may hamper the attainment of 1943 production goals in the Delta area. The 20-percent increase in acreage of long-staple cotton will call for additional picking labor, especially on the larger plantations, where most of the increase in such cotton will be grown. In the Ozark Plateau expansion of the tomato acreage will bring peak season completion for labor with the grape harvest. Extra labor will be needed from the villages, especially in August. In the Rice area a shortage of skilled labor in 1943 is anticipated.

LOUISIANA

In 1942 there has been in Louisiana a 15-percent increase in need for labor because of increased acreage of crops, notably soybeans, cotton, and peanuts. There will be difficulties in securing labor for harvest, beginning with rice in August, and ending with cotton and sugar cane in December, but 1942 production goals will probably be attained.

Soybean production in Louisiana rose from 196,000 bu. in 1941 to 790,000 bu. (expected) in 1942. Feasible production for 1943 is 2,671,000 bu. or more than 13 times the production of 1941. Cotton acreage in 1942 increased over 1941 by 2 percent; a further increase of 6 percent in 1943 is indicated. Peanut acreage in 1942 was 45,000 acres, as compared with 10,000 in 1941; acreage for 1943 is placed at 100,000.

Rice-harvest labor for 1943 will have to be recruited from more distant sources than usual. The laborious work does not permit use of women and children to any considerable extent. Some easing of the situation may be effected by extending the harvest season. Cotton labor will be at a premium, but the situation will not be acute; it will be easier to solve than in the case of rice

and sugar cane. Sugar-cane harvest laborers have always been imported in part; in 1942 and 1943 they will have to be sought at greater distances than usual. Cane-harvesting machinery to reduce labor demand will be difficult or impossible to obtain.

In 1942 wage rates, both for cotton picking and the rice harvest, have been below the level offered in corresponding areas of Texas and Arkansas. This has resulted in some migration of workers from Louisiana.

The areas in which the labor situation is likely to be most onerous in 1943 are the Red River Bottom and Uplands and the Sugar Cane region.

OKLAHOMA

With the opening of the cotton, peanut, and feed-grain harvest, the demand for labor on Oklahoma farms increased markedly and evidences of a tightening situation were noted from many quarters. The seasonal surplus of labor, available earlier in the season and coveted by numerous out-of-State employers, temporarily vanished. This is a recurring seasonal phenomenon which was emphasized this year by the fivefold increase over 1941 in peanut acreage in the eastern cotton-producing section of the State, the largest cotton crop since 1933, above-average feed crops, and a smaller "regular" farm-labor force. The U. S. Employment Service and State Labor Subcommittee are confident that 1942 crops will be harvested.

The State expects no general shortages of farm labor in 1943. A 10-to 15-percent increase in crop acreages and total livestock production is estimated as probable, but even with a drop in supply of labor there should be a surplus of labor except in the northwest fifth of the State. A shortage of qualified labor is imminent, especially on dairy farms and ranches, and including tractor and combine operators. Motor moving of workers from surplus to needy areas may be handicapped by transportation difficulties because of gasoline, tire, and repair situations.

In 1943 an increase of 57 percent over 1942 in the peanut acreage is regarded as feasible, also an increase of 141 percent in flaxseed acreage, a 15-percent increase in milk production, a 10-percent increase in hog production, and a 16-percent increase in wool shorn on farms.

The Panhandle has apparently plenty of machinery and labor to handle estimated feasible increased production. In the North Rolling Plains the shortage of experienced dairy hands will probably prevent more than a slight increase of milk production.

The Cross Timber area has a considerable surplus of labor, and this will probably extend through 1943 but there will be a lack of experienced labor to handle the prospective large increase in the peanut crop. Only isolated shortages of labor are expected in 1943 in the Ozark-Ouachita Highlands. Strawberry pickers may be needed. If the harvest season for peanuts is short, extra digging and stacking labor will be in demand. In the Coastal Plains there is competition for labor with the defense plants in nearby Texas.

TEXAS

Texas farmers are harvesting the largest cotton crop since 1937, a record peanut acreage, a rice crop nearly 40 percent larger than that of 1941, and bumper feed crops, - with a larger-than-usual working labor force. It is a Texas labor force. The more attractive wages being offered this season have tapped heretofore unused sources of farm-labor supply. Thousands of domestics and other low-paid urban workers, farm and nonfarm women, and some unskilled construction laborers are answering the call of higher farm wages. The migration from the lower valley this season is at least a third larger than normal - actual count July 15 - September 5 inclusive, 24,846 compared to estimates for past seasons of around 18,000. Despite unfavorable weather conditions, progress has been made in harvesting the crops of South and Central Texas and little if any economic loss traceable to labor shortage has occurred. Some local labor shortages may be expected in East Texas peanut harvest, and the Coastal Prairie rice harvest may present something of a problem. Given favorable weather, Texas farmers will harvest the 1942 crops without serious loss.

Looking toward 1943, the Texas farm labor situation is confusing. Agricultural leaders view the prospect with concern. What effect will the stabilization of farm prices and wages have on the ability of Texas farmers to attract labor to farms? How much of the prime male labor force will be taken into the army within the next year? To what extent can they be replaced by women, children, and older people? The construction phase of war plants, cantonments, etc., will be largely completed by June 1943, but will these released construction workers return to the farm-labor force?

In 1943 the labor problem will be most difficult during harvesting seasons, especially in the case of peanuts, cotton, small grain, grain sorghum, and commercial vegetables. The labor supply should be adequate for pre-harvest requirements of the crop acreages regarded as feasible.

Except for peanut pickers, farm machinery will not be a serious problem in the attainment of production goals on Texas farms. The 1942 cotton acreage for the State as a whole is expected to be 5 percent above that for 1941; in 1943 a 3-percent increase over 1942 is indicated. The seeded wheat acreage is expected to increase by 2 percent.

Panhandle Wheat Area: This area has always been characterized by labor-demand peaks at harvest time which far exceed the limited local supply. Despite the widespread combine harvest of grain sorghums, which this year and in 1943 will lessen labor requirements for this crop, it is anticipated that by 1943 there will be a rather serious farm-labor shortage in this area. In 1942, Texas had 200,000 acres more of grain sorghum than in 1941; in 1943 an additional 600,000 acres are regarded as feasible.

High Plains Cotton Area: The cotton and wheat acreages are expected to be essentially the same as for 1942. This area ordinarily depends to a large extent on migratory labor to harvest the cotton crop. It is anticipated that there will be a considerable labor shortage in the area by 1943.

Low Rolling Plains Area: The same acreages of cotton and wheat may be expected in 1943 as in 1942. No substantial increase in peanut acreage over 1942 is anticipated. Somewhat more grain sorghums should be feasible in 1943.

There will be a rather pronounced labor shortage in the fall of 1943 due to the customary dependence on migratory labor for harvesting the cotton crop and grain sorghums. However, effective utilization of the local labor supply plus extensive combine harvesting of grain sorghums will mitigate, if not altogether solve, the problem.

High Plains Trans-Pecos Cattle Grazing Area: An increase in the acreage of long-staple or Pima cotton is recommended for 1943. This will mean an increase in the peak load of seasonal labor during hoeing and harvesting. This labor is mainly transient.

Upper Rio Grande Valley - Irrigated Area (El Paso County): No additional labor was needed within the area until cotton-picking time, when it was believed that labor from outside the areas would have to be secured. The estimate is 2500 workers for a ninety day period at cotton-picking time.

Labor needs for cotton harvest will be about the same in 1943 as in 1942. The demand cannot be met entirely from local sources.

Edwards Plateau Grazing Area: This area in 1942 is expected to harvest more than three times the acreage harvested in 1941 but is about 2,000 acres short of the 1942 goal (35,000 acres). Even this figure will involve difficulties with seasonal labor since harvest season for cotton and peanuts tend to coincide. Transient laborers do not normally visit the area best adapted to peanut production.

Ranchmen are in difficulty because of movement of experienced labor from the area. This type of labor is highly skilled and is not easily replaced. It is expected that some loss in production will result.

Rio Grande Plains Area: The general shortage of farm labor may affect vegetable and citrus production in this area where harvesting of this crop takes place between December first and April first. Peanuts and cotton harvests overlap from August first to October first. There is a need for side-delivery rakes for peanut harvesting, thus permitting piling of peanut vines rather than the use of hand labor.

Lower Rio Grande Valley: The committee believes that about a 20 percent increase over the 1942 acreage in the production of fresh commercial vegetables is feasible for 1943. Present indications are that a larger acreage of tomatoes than was planted could have been harvested in 1942 with the existing labor supply.

The Western Cross Timbers Farming Area: In 1941 peanut acreage was 144,000. The goal for 1942 was 296,000. The committee feels that it is feasible to produce 250,000 acres of peanuts in this area in 1943. (Expected acreage for 1942 is 306,000).

Farmers believe that they will have sufficient labor for the cotton and peanut harvest this fall but believe that the situation will be more difficult in 1943.

Grand Prairie Area: The rapidly decreasing farm-labor supply and the increasing livestock numbers justify the view that cotton acreage should be reduced to 80 percent of the allotment. A peanut acreage of 25 percent above the 1942 goals is considered feasible for this area in 1943. As cotton and peanut harvests tend to coincide there may be a serious seasonal labor problem. Numerous defense projects are located within and near the area.

Black Prairie Area: Substantial increases can be obtained in the production of some of the commodities vital to the war effort despite a decreased labor supply. This refers to cotton, peanuts, corn, cattle, and dairy enterprises.

Labor will undoubtedly be one of the principal obstacles to production in 1943. Migratory labor is used for cotton picking and onion harvesting. Estimates of labor supply and demand for peak load periods indicate that approximately two-thirds of the total labor shortage for the State will occur in this area. Increased use of family labor and labor-saving equipment may solve the problem on small farms but large operators will be hard pressed.

Coast Prairie Area: Apparently there will be enough available farm labor to handle feasible production in 1943 although labor will have to be utilized more carefully, particularly in rice-harvest operations. Workers in the rice harvest are of a specialized type that cannot easily be replaced. In the fall of 1942, dairy farms in the vicinity of Houston were already complaining of a serious shortage of competent workers.

On account of the many war industries concentrated along the coast, this may well be one of the more critical Texas areas in the matter of labor supply in 1943.

MOUNTAIN STATES

MONTANA

In 1942 all counties reported concern over the farm labor situation, nevertheless 1942 agricultural production goals will be met, with the possible exception of that for milk. In this case labor is a factor of importance.

In dairying it is the loss of full-time workers which, along with other things, affected production while in most other enterprises in this area it is loss of seasonal workers that is stressed. The milk production goal as of January 1942, was 770 million pounds; indicated production, as of July, was 757 million pounds. Feasible production for 1943 is 858 million pounds. In some areas (for instance, Wheatland, Rosebud, Carter) the labor factor is more important than in others. According to War Board reports, in the Great Falls

area large dairies are so reducing production that milk is being moved by truck from Bozeman and Billings to meet the need of the increased air-base population. Milk sold for commercial use during the period January - June 1942 was 93 percent of milk sold for the same purpose in 1941. (Report of War Board Chairman, 9/15/42) Prospects for 1943 milk production in Montana depend to a considerable degree upon the availability of competent year-round hands.

Sugar beets are the principal cash crop grown under irrigation in Montana. Approximately 71 percent of the beet acreage of the State is in the Yellowstone Valley. In 1941 the total acreage was 66,000 acres as compared with 85,000 in 1940, the year of greatest production. In 1942 about 82,000 acres were planted, curtailment being in large part due to anticipation of labor shortage. The feasible beet acreage for 1943 is 90,000 acres, but unless the labor situation improves it is likely that 1943 acreage will be below that of 1942.

In some counties it is believed that in 1943 there will be a shift from sheep to cattle, on account of the fear of a labor shortage. In 1942 considerable difficulty has been experienced in obtaining competent lambers, shearers, and herders.

Labor for harvesting operations has been scarce so some winter feed has been left upon the ground. On the whole, however, although the harvest of 1942 has been slower than usual, it has progressed satisfactorily. Many farmers have had to shut down their combines while hauling wheat, and during combining one man has often had to do the work previously handled by two or three. A number of combines have come in from Nebraska, Kansas, and Texas.

IDAHO

In 1942 concern over possible scarcity of farm labor in Idaho related chiefly to sugar beets and range livestock, the former in southern Idaho and the latter in the south central area.

Sugar beet acreage in 1942 amounted to 85,000 acres as compared with 62,000 in 1941. Although all good stands of beets were thinned this year, many growers had difficulty in securing labor and, consequently, became apprehensive over the labor prospects for the beet harvest. In some counties in southern Idaho potatoes and sugar beets require harvesting labor at the same time (in October and November), the severity of the competition depending chiefly on weather conditions. Prospects for the 1943 crop of sugar beets have been affected by the uncertainty with respect to labor in 1942. The feasible acreage for 1943 is estimated at 80,000 acres.

In the sheep industry, uncertainty with regard to both labor, especially sheep herders, and feed will prevent any expansion in 1943. The estimated number of sheep regarded as feasible for 1943 is 2,048,000 as compared with 2,068,000 in 1942 and 2,075,000 for 1941. Despite the high cost of winter feeds and the shortage of range riders, it appears that in the beef cattle

industry some increase in numbers (from 840,000 in 1942 to 866,000 in 1943) will take place. In large part this increase will be in small herds on dry land wheat farms, offsetting reductions on the part of larger operators dependent on hired labor.

In 1943 there will be a tendency for dairy herds to increase where family labor is used and to decrease where hired labor is depended upon. The total number is expected to increase from 235,000, as indicated in July 1942, to 244,000 in 1943.

The labor situation in Idaho may be affected in 1943, as in 1942, by the existence in eastern Oregon and central Washington of a higher wage scale for farm work at certain critical seasons. This frequently draws workers from Idaho at the time they are most needed, at the height of the September-October peak.

WYOMING

In Wyoming, in 1942, producers of sheep and of sugar beets were particularly concerned over the supply of labor. Loss of experienced year-round hands has been complained of more than in other States in the Great Plains area. The number of sheep is expected to decrease somewhat in 1943 (from 3,889,000 on January 1, 1942, to 3,807,000 in 1943.) Ranchers are reported to be shifting from sheep to cattle in their 1943 production plans. In 1943 the area represented by Carbon, Sweetwater, Converse, and Natrona counties is likely to be most seriously affected by the difficulty of securing labor for sheep ranching.

Sugar-beet acreage increased from 40,000 acres in 1941 to 50,000 acres in 1942. Feasible acreage for 1943 is placed at 53,000 acres, an acreage which will be impossible to attain if there is any decided worsening of the sugar-beet labor situation. The difficulties of securing beet labor are likely to be greatest in the northern beet areas of Big Horn, Park, and Washakie Counties.

COLORADO

In Colorado it is mostly sugar-beet and sheep enterprises that have been affected by the fact or anticipation of labor scarcity in 1942. The situation has been complicated by the demand for both skilled and unskilled farm labor from several important construction jobs, such as the John Martin dam in Bent County, an airport improvement at La Junta, an army camp at Colorado Springs, and a munitions depot at Pueblo. In addition, there has been a greatly intensified demand for labor from war industries in the State, as well as from the railroads. Reports from Colorado say that there has been, since the spring of 1942, a shortage of skilled farm workers such as tractor drivers, milkers, irrigators, sheep herders, sheep shearers, etc. Conditions have been particularly stringent in the Arkansas Valley and on the Western Slope. These two areas are expected to give rise to a critical labor problem in 1943, along with the San Luis Valley and the South Platts irrigated district.

Sugar-beet acreage in Colorado, as indicated in July 1942, was 195,000 acres, as compared with 135,000 in 1941. However, the spring of 1942 was unfavorable for beets, part of the acreage planted was on land not prepared for beets; and part of the acreage had to be replanted, resulting often in poor stands in the replanted fields. Because of weather conditions and the relative scarcity of labor, part of the beets were late in being thinned. Despite these difficulties, normal yields per acre will be obtained because of an abnormally favorable growing season. In 1943 it is anticipated that the acreage will be about 180,000 acres. This reduction will be the result of higher relative prices for competitive crops, especially beans and potatoes, and of fear of difficulties in obtaining necessary seasonal labor.

As regards livestock, apparently in the mountain range area there will be a reduction in numbers of sheep and lambs from January 1, 1942 to January 1, 1943, due in part to adverse weather conditions, shortage of experienced herders, and decrease in the yield per acre of native hay because of lack of labor and equipment to harvest it. In some areas, however, Colorado farmers are expanding their businesses by adding livestock in place of crops. Total numbers, both of sheep and lambs and of cattle and calves, may be somewhat higher in 1943 than in 1942. The same is true of wool production.

In production of dry beans, an increase of 12 percent over the 1941 acreage (340,000) is expected in 1942, and in 1943 an additional increase of 6 percent over 1942 acreage is expected. The relatively high price and low labor requirements of this crop are responsible for this increase. (1943 feasible: 402,000 acres)

NEW MEXICO

Anxiety over labor in New Mexico in 1942 has centered around cotton, especially SXP cotton, and range livestock. In Dona Ana County, as in the adjoining Texas counties of El Paso and Hudspeth, - the concern of cotton growers over the labor situation has led to a persistent agitation in favor of importation of labor from Mexico, in which New Mexico cotton growers were joined by sugar beet producers in California and cotton growers in southern Texas. In New Mexico, war projects at Hobbs, Alamogordo, Carlsbad, Roswell, Lordsburg, Las Cruces, and elsewhere drew heavily on the labor supply. At the same time, labor in northern New Mexico, was being drawn north to the beet fields and sheep ranches of Colorado, Montana, and Wyoming. Uneasiness was generally felt as to whether the customary migratory labor supply from Texas, Arkansas, and Oklahoma would be available in the usual volume.

Despite gloomy anticipations based on such factors as the foregoing, it appeared (in October) that the supply of farm labor had been adequate for all operations up to that time and would be sufficient for the peak cotton operations in October and November, but much depended upon the ability of transient laborers to secure transportation and upon the prevailing wage scale in the cotton areas.

In New Mexico special interest attaches to the crop of American-Egyptian (SXP) cotton, of which there were about 21,000 acres in the State in 1941, and (July indication) 30,000 acres in 1942. Feasible acreage for 1943 is set at 33,600 acres. Most of the increases in recent years have been in Dona Ana County. Prospects for 1943 will be affected by the labor situation. Workers prefer to pick Acala cotton; moreover, the SXP becomes damaged much more rapidly than the Acala if not picked as soon as mature. If producers have difficulty in getting SXP harvested in 1942, or if they anticipate serious difficulty in 1943, plantings for 1943 will be affected adversely.

In 1942 range livestock production goals apparently will be met with little difficulty. Feasible cattle numbers for 1943, however, are set somewhat lower than the numbers for 1942 (1,275,000), mainly because of the shortage of skilled range labor. Numbers of sheep and lambs in 1942 (2,216,000) fall below the level of 1941 (2,310,000); in 1943 numbers are not expected to be increased over 1942. Sheep and goat operators cannot exchange work as advantageously as cattle men; their dependence upon skilled labor is much greater.

In 1942, anticipation of labor shortage has led to reluctance on the part of farmers to increase the production of pinto beans but feasible production of dry beans for 1943 in New Mexico is set at 314,000 acres, an increase over the 1942 (July indicated) acreage of 292,000 acres. AAA wheat quotas have held wheat acreage constant; otherwise farmers would probably increase wheat production as one way of shifting to a crop having relatively low labor requirements.

Lack of labor will not prevent a moderate increase in commercial truck crops in 1943, because most of the production will be obtained on small farms on which family labor largely meets the need during peak seasons. Cannery capacity, however, may be an obstacle to increased truck production.

Critical areas in 1943 will be the Lower Pecos and Mesilla Valleys.

ARIZONA

In Arizona, in 1942, scarcity of labor, or fear of scarcity, made itself felt in cotton production, especially that of American-Egyptian cotton, in dairying and in the livestock industry.

In 1941 approximately 35 percent of the total cropland under irrigation in Arizona was planted to cotton; in 1942, almost 40 percent. Although cotton production in 1941 was the lowest since 1935, the gross cash income from cotton lint and seed amounted to a little more than one-fourth of the total gross cash income from farm and ranch production. The large acreage of American-Egyptian cotton in Arizona during World War I declined rapidly during the post war depression. In 1927 there were only 21,000 acres of this variety. The year 1940 marked the beginning of a period of expansion; in 1941 acreage rose to 100,000, while for 1942 it is estimated that 126,000 acres will be harvested. Feasible production of this type of cotton in 1943 is placed at 136,000 acres.

Arizona depends mostly on out-of-State workers to harvest the cotton crop. It is estimated that 23,000 to 26,000 cotton pickers are required during the period from October 1 through December. This year approximately 8,000 resident workers are available. Wage rates for cotton picking in Oklahoma and Texas having risen, the movement of workers from those areas to Arizona is influenced by the wage scale offered in Arizona, among other things.

Pickers prefer to work in Upland (short staple) cotton, rather than American-Egyptian, because it is possible to pick twice as much of the former per day, with the expenditure of less physical energy. Yields of Upland are much more uniform so the earnings of a picker in a field of Upland cotton are likely to be larger in a specified time than in a field in which the yield is "spotty." To secure pickers for the long-staple cotton, it appears to be necessary to offer special inducements to meet the competition of the Upland growers. It is the contention of American-Egyptian growers that at present prices they are unable to do this. The outcome of the cotton situation in 1942 will have a decisive bearing upon prospects of cotton production for 1943, when the necessary labor from the outside will presumably be more difficult to obtain than in 1942.

On dairy farms it has been difficult to obtain competent help. While the number of milk cows in Arizona in 1942 has come up to expectations, milk production has fallen short of the 1942 goal, being only slightly higher than that of 1941 (1941: 241 million pounds). The number of cows regarded as feasible for 1943 is set at 46,000, - one thousand more than in 1942 - but milk production is expected to fall to 235 million pounds.

Similar difficulties in securing competent workers - cowhands, sheep herders, and shearers - have been experienced in the ranch and livestock industry. In 1943, due to the labor and feed situation, the number of cattle and calves is expected to drop by 50,000 from the figure of 980,000 for 1942 but sheep numbers are expected to increase from 767,000 in 1942 to 775,000 in 1943.

The Salt River Valley and the irrigated areas in Yuma County are likely to be the areas of crucial importance in labor matters in 1943.

UTAH

As in other States in the Mountain area, the farm enterprises in Utah most directly affected by the labor situation in 1942 were those connected with sugar beets and sheep.. In Utah, production of canning tomatoes and of milk was also affected. There has been a remarkable expansion of war industry and military installations especially in the area extending from Cache to Utah Counties, which contains most of the State's population and three cities -- Salt Lake City, Ogden, and Provo. At the same time, this is the area upon which, except for range livestock, the State's production of vital war commodities largely depends. Thirty-four percent of the sugar beets, all of the canning tomatoes, 85 percent of the canning peas, and 58 percent of the milk, as well as most of the truck crops, poultry, and fruit, are produced in this area.

Sugar-beet acreage, as of July 1942, amounted to 49,000 acres, as compared with 42,000 in 1941. Acreage regarded as feasible in 1943 is 51,000 acres, although much will depend upon the prospects for labor in the spring of 1943. In 1942 some difficulty was experienced in securing labor for sugar-beet thinning at the time most favorable to maximum sugar production.

For the State as a whole, sheep numbers for 1942 are slightly higher than those for 1941 and in 1943 it is expected that the same level will be maintained. Production per head, however, will be greatly affected by the availability of skilled herders and shearers, concerning which there was much complaint in 1942.

The acreage of tomatoes for canning in 1942 (8,900) is about 16 percent higher than that of 1941; the same level, under present limitations of field and factory labor, will probably prevail in 1943.

Milk production in 1942 was indicated in July to be only 1 million pounds more than in 1941 (1942 - 242 million pounds), a figure some 22 million pounds short of the 1942 goal. Feasible production for 1943 was placed at 235 million pounds. Milk cows, however, were listed at 102,000 as of July 1942 (1941: 99,000), while for 1943 the feasible number was placed at 105,000. There appears to be a decided trend toward increase of the number of dairy cows on diversified irrigated farms (many of them of small size) on which there is lower productive efficiency than on the large commercial farms which are now at a disadvantage because of their dependence upon hired labor.

NEVADA

In Nevada, the farm laborers of whom most has been heard in 1942 are sheep herders and milkers.

Although some of the larger dairies have dispersed their herds because of the scarcity of milkers, the cows have gone into other, and for the most part, smaller herds. Consequently there is as yet no net change in number of dairy cows, which in July 1942, as in 1941, was 20,000. In 1943 no reduction of this number is anticipated. However, milk production in 1942 (July 1942 indications: 118 million pounds) was less than the goal set in January; and the 1943 production was expected to fall to the level of 1941 - 115 million pounds. Feed conditions and price relationships, as well as labor scarcity, affect this situation. Actual supplies of hay may be decreased somewhat due to an increase in the proportion of hay land that is pastured on account of labor conditions. This is in spite of moisture conditions favorable to hay production in the Humboldt bottoms and in other hay lands in the northeastern part of the State.

The number of cattle and calves in Nevada increased by 10 thousand (July indication) over 1941 and it is thought that in 1943 it will be feasible to maintain this number (97,000) or to increase it slightly (100,000). With sheep the most critical problem was the securing of competent herders. The number of sheep and lambs increased from 785,000 in 1941 to 793,000 in 1942 but in 1943 some decrease is expected.

PACIFIC STATES

WASHINGTON

In Washington, the early fears of loss of agricultural production in 1942 because of labor shortage proved to be exaggerated although seasonal labor demands have required unusual measures. The dairy situation is particularly serious. Wage offers have almost doubled but still employers are unable to get workers. Specialized dairy enterprises in the western part of the State are hardest hit. Slaughter of herds may result.

Labor difficulties are said to be the principal obstacle to attainment of 1943 production in Washington. Cattle production may feasibly be increased by 11 percent, sheep production by 6 percent, over 1942. An increase of milk production by 17 percent is regarded as feasible, provided that labor difficulties beyond expectation do not intervene. Egg production can be increased by 11 percent. Here, as with dairies, specialized enterprises in western Washington face 1943 with much less confidence than do the family-size farms. Green peas for canning could be increased readily, were processing facilities and labor available, especially in the Walla Walla-Blue Mountain area. Growers in the Wenatchee-Yakima Valley district (like truck crop, berry, and fruit growers on the West Side) will have a serious seasonal labor problem in 1943.

OREGON

In Oregon, as in Washington and California, the supply of farm labor in 1942 has not been available in customary numbers but there is no evidence that the scarcity of labor has caused any material loss in production. The difficulties encountered in securing an ample and experienced labor supply in 1942 may have a significant effect on the planting programs for 1943. Where reasonable alternatives are available, there may be a shift from labor intensive crops. Farmers will come close enough to a real labor shortage this year to make them hesitate to plant heavy labor-consuming crops next year. Many of the labor intensive crops are not among the most important to the war effort, and there are areas in which a shift from specialty crops to food crops would be advantageous.

There is need for a clear, official statement of the relative importance of the various products to the war effort. This would help in securing maximum use of the decreasing labor supply.

A large part of the dairy industry is concentrated in the metropolitan areas where competition from war industries is keen. Even when the wage for milkers is equal or greater than the wage offered in war industries, the war-industry job is more attractive. In some instances range-sheep operators are shifting to cattle because specialized workers such as herders, lambers, and shearers are hard to replace.

The greatest demand for seasonal labor is for the berry harvest. The usual source of supply -- women, children, and townspeople -- has not been

depleted. The important problem is transportation; evidence indicates that where the transportation problem has been solved, the labor problem has been solved, also. The introduction of hop-picking machines in the Yakima Valley and Oregon will ease the labor situation in regard to hops, but a sufficient number of machines have not been available to eliminate the problem. Throughout the Northwest, tractor and truck drivers are scarce.

There no doubt will be fewer workers over most of the western region for harvesting small grains, hay, dried beans, and dried peas. These shortages will be widespread but not serious. Experienced workers will be scarce and expensive, and the cry of shortage will be frequent. Nevertheless, the comment that "we will get by" is heard repeatedly in private conversations with farmers who grow these crops. This is especially true in eastern Oregon, eastern Washington, Idaho, and Nevada, where farmers have developed a tradition of cooperative attitude in use of labor and equipment.

Comments follow on certain types of production:

Dairying: Milk production for 1942 is expected to increase 3 percent over 1941. It is estimated that a 7 percent increase over 1942 in milk production is feasible in 1943, in the light of the present feed and labor situation.

If sufficient labor were available to operate the dairy plant at somewhere near operating efficiency and capacity, an increase of from 20 to 25 percent would be possible (other price and feed conditions corresponding.)

Beef Production: Figures for 1943 production show 1.6 percent decrease of beef cows under 1942, which in January 1942 were 8.6 percent higher than January 1941. Livestock numbers are primarily dependent upon hay supplies, which are dependent upon haying labor, 1942 hay production, and the severity of the 1942-3 winter. The availability of haying labor is a major concern of the beef producer. Otherwise labor costs are not the major inhibiting factor in beef production.

Sheep: There is a critical shortage of sheepherders, drawn away by high industrial wages and the draft; it is impossible to replace these highly skilled men.

A reduction of 59,000 in total sheep numbers is expected in 1942; a further reduction of 43,000 in all sheep is expected in 1943 under present labor conditions (assuming a normal winter). Range sheep production could be increased over 1942 if labor were assured.

Forage and Cover Crop Seeds: There has been a rapid increase in production since 1939, mostly in the Willamette Valley (winter legumes and common ryegrass). No increase is expected in the Willamette Valley in 1943. Between 75,000 to 100,000 additional acres of winter legumes for seed could feasibly be grown in the rest of the State, approximately half of this acreage being in Klamath, Union, and Malheur Counties and the remainder in Douglas, Jackson, and Baker Counties.

Availability of labor and machinery for harvesting and cleaning the crops, and of shipping facilities, appear to be the problems in handling the 1943 production.

Sugar beets: Labor is now sufficient to meet the needs of the season. No increase in beet acreage is anticipated for 1943 because of lack of factory capacity. If the present 300 Japanese remain in Malheur County, labor needs of 1943 will be met.

Vegetables for Processing: Labor is a factor in harvesting. Especially green bean pickers are important but processing facilities are more influential as a limitation. The 1943 production will be limited to the 1942 level, for reasons connected with these two factors.

Fresh Vegetables: Very little increase is expected in 1943 because of labor shortages and lack of experienced growers to replace Japanese.

Poultry: Competition of war industries for labor in the Willamette Valley is a major factor in increasing the number of idle poultry houses on small places formerly having small flocks of several hundred hens. The operators have sold off their flocks and have gone into war jobs.

Many large commercial poultrymen are unwilling to expand because of uncertainty of being able to retain competent hired labor.

CALIFORNIA

May 1942 marks the first time that the number of employees in manufacturing in California has exceeded 700,000 persons. Preliminary estimates of the California Division of Labor Statistics indicate that about 2,222,000 persons were employed in nonagricultural activity in the State during May. This is an increase of 16 percent above the 1,915,000 employed in May of 1941.

The expansion of industrial employment has depleted the reservoir of unemployed in this State. In addition, higher wages and superior job security offered for skilled and semi-skilled workers have attracted many such workers from agricultural employment.

By the end of 1942 there will have been a reduction in the year-round male farm labor force in California of 15 to 20 percent.

The farm-labor situation during the first half of 1942 was not so difficult as had been anticipated. There was a tendency to treat anticipated shortages as realities, because the loss of sons and hired men to military service, the movement of rural people into war industries, and the evacuation of Japanese gave evidence of a reduction in labor supply.

Some crop losses were sustained. Lack of labor at critical periods contributed to losses of strawberries, cherries, and sugar beets, but these losses were due to a combination of factors.

Despite the marked reduction in farm-labor supply, there were sufficient persons in the farm labor force to permit farm employment to increase month by month through the May-June secondary peak, at rates in excess of the usual seasonal pattern. This does not imply that farmers had all the workers they wanted. They had less efficient workers and had to pay from 30 to 40 percent higher wages for them. This situation is not peculiar to agriculture; it is characteristic of the general employment situation in our expanding war economy.

Forecasting farm-labor conditions in California in 1943 calls for even more tenacity than is required in most other States. However, comments on certain lines of production likely to be affected are as follows:

Cotton: The labor situation is undoubtedly preventing growers from increasing their cotton plantings. In 1942, growers were urged to plant their full AAA allotment of 400,000 acres. In July, 364,000 were indicated. For 1943 no larger acreage is regarded as feasible.

Sugar Beets: Limiting factors are the supply of labor and equipment, the price situation, and in some areas, the processing capacity.

Per acre labor costs in mid-1942 are estimated to be twice the amount paid in 1941; this is partly due to higher hourly rates, partly to lower quality and quantity of work performed. An increase in the price of sugar beets or some guarantee that labor costs will not rise seems necessary if beets are to compete successfully with other intertilled or labor-extensive crops.

The 1942 plantings were about 190,000 acres, the largest ever made. The expected yield of 15.3 tons per planted acre is slightly below yields obtained in most years; this is due to labor shortages which delayed field operations. Total production this year is not expected to exceed that of 1940, the year of previous record acreage. Feasible acreage for 1943 is estimated to be about 7 percent higher than 1942 plantings; attainment of this would probably call for measures to reduce labor requirements or extend the period over which labor could be used, such as staggering of plantings and piling beets for later processing.

In the important beet-producing counties of the Sacramento Valley and Delta (Yolo, Sacramento, and Colusa) many growers experienced difficulty in getting their beets thinned. If the 1942 crop is harvested successfully, the acreage of beets feasible in the Sacramento Valley for 1943 will be about the same as this year. In the Delta region the harvest must be completed before the rainy season begins, for the mud is so bad that the beets cannot be pulled out.

In the San Joaquin Valley sugar-beet acreage in 1943 will be limited primarily by refinery capacity and to some extent by labor conditions. The introduction of sheared seed and cross blocking has eliminated much of the necessity for hand cultivation. The use of topping machines has cut down the labor in harvesting.

